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Abstract: This paper attempts to integrate among international fragmentation, trade 
liberalization and health sector. For this purpose we have considered two different models based 
on Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson general equilibrium structure, with special reference to the 
health sector. In the first model we have considered four sectors and we have assumed the 
production process of the health sector can be fragmented. In such a set up we have shown that a 
movement from a regime of no fragmentation to a regime of fragmentation may lead to an 
expansion of the health sector. In the second model we have considered three sectors and have 
assumed that production process of the health sector is fragmented. In that structure we have 
shown that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the output level of the health sector. 
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International Fragmentation in the Presence of Alternative Health Sector 
Scenario : A Theoretical Analysis 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the importance of health sector as a potential engine of growth as well as for 
development for a developing economy like India has been argued by many contemporary 
economists. The health sector has shown a growth of 9.3 % between 2000-2009, comparable to 
the sectoral growth of other emerging economies such as China and Brazil1.  The total value of 
the sector was more than $38 billion, about 5.1% of GDP (Ernst & Young: Fostering quality 
healthcare for all, 2008). Indian Healthcare market is estimated to touch US$ 77 billion by 
2013(Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2007). Healthcare industry accounted for 5.1% of India’s GDP 
in 2006. The compound annual growth rate of Indian healthcare sector was 16% during the 
1990s. (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2007) and is expected to grow at a compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of 15% over the next 15 years (Ernst & Young: Fostering quality healthcare for all, 
2008). It is also expected to generate employment to 9 million people in 2012. (Ernst & Young: 
Fostering quality healthcare for all, 2008).  
In recent past the recession in 2008 and recent economic slowdown since 2011 intensified by the 
Eurozone crisis and the slowdown in the US economy, have brought about a gloom in world 
economic growth projections. A recent report released by the United Nations (UN) shows that all 
developing economies will get affected by the slowdown. However, the good news is that East 
Asian and South Asian economies are increasingly being seen as growth drivers of the world as 
an outcome of which the health sector has grown exponentially. A CII- Mckinsey report states 
that the Indian health sector has emerged as one of the largest service sectors with estimated 
revenue of around $30 billion constituting 5% of GDP and offering employment to around 4 
million people. By 2025, the Indian population will touch 1.4 billion with about 45% constituting 
urban adults2. To cater to this demographic change, the health sector will have to be about $100 
billion in size contributing nearly 8-10% of the future GDP. The growth in the health service 
sector would be driven by health care facilities, medical diagnostic and pathological laboratories 
and medical equipment sector. All these growth inducing factors are related with Medical 
                                                             
1 Source: Yes Bank and Assocham report, as quoted by IBEF report on Healthcare accessed on 30.01.2012. 
2 Source: The Times of India, dated: 02.02.2012. 
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equipment and devices. Medical equipment and devices industry is another sector that is very 
closely tied up with the health service sector. Actually health service sector uses medical 
equipment and devices as an intermediate product for the production purpose. Advancement and 
innovations in medical technology resulted huge improvement in this intermediate sector. In 
India, over 65% of the medical equipments are still being imported from abroad in a very fast 
growing domestic market and it was 80%- 90% in the pre liberalization period3. It is very often 
argued that developing countries like India, import medical equipments and other related devices 
for its health service. Such a health service sector can be considered as an exportable sector The 
medical equipments and devices market is worth US$ 1505 million in India and the demand is 
growing at about 15% per year.  
 
It is to be noted that given the growing demand, the emergence of reputed private players and the 
huge investment needs in the healthcare sector, has resulted in growing interest among foreign 
players and non-resident Indians to enter the Indian healthcare market. The growing presence of 
corporate players and foreign investors in India’s health sector, although highlighted and also 
documented in various reports by different sources, is not yet well understood in terms of its 
current status as well as its implications for the health system at large. For example, while the 
emergence of corporate hospitals or foreign funding and tie ups in the hospital segment can have 
many positive implications, such as helping to improve physical infrastructure, standards, quality 
of healthcare, technology, and processes along with spill over benefits in areas such as medical 
devices, pharmaceuticals, outsourcing, and research and development, it may also result in 
higher costs of health care and greater segmentation between the public and private health 
sectors. Thus, there is a need to examine whether there exists any constraint related to inflow of 
foreign capital in health sector. However, there are external and domestic factors, which 
constrain foreign investment, especially foreign direct investment (FDI hereafter) in India’s 
hospital segment. One of the external factors, which has been noted is that, notwithstanding 
trends towards privatization in health in major developed countries, this is a sector that is 
undergoing reform and internal problems in those economies. In many countries, the number of 
private players who can establish hospitals overseas is limited. Hence, the potential number of 
overseas institutions that can invest in emerging markets may be rather limited. Again, for some 
                                                             
3 This implies health service sector is internationally fragmented. 
4 
 
countries it is primarily domestic factors that are specific to the hospital business that are 
responsible for limiting the extent of FDI in India’s hospitals. These include initial establishment 
related factors as well as post-establishment related operational issues, which affect the returns to 
investment. To remove these problems state have taken some steps in a post globalization period 
and they are  
1) reduction of import duty for medical equipments and devices to 5% with countervailing duty 
(CVD) 0f 4%, over 50% of which are being imported. Assistive devices, rehabilitation aids, etc. 
have been completely exempted from CVD (Union Budget 2010-2011),  
2) relaxed rules for the NRI medical practitioners to invest and provide medical services in India 
(Baru, 1998) and depreciation rates for essential equipments and consumables increasing from 
25% to 40%, giving tax saving incentive to the healthcare institutions,  
3) introduction of Medical Visa  and Medical Attendant Visa for a period of one year with four 
multiple entries in 2005 and allowing 100% FDI in Healthcare sector in 2000,  
4) making long term loans and capital cheaper for Healthcare institutions due to 2002-2003 and 
2003-2004 union budget and introduction of 100% Income Tax exemption for a period of five 
years, for new hospitals with more than 100 beds and located outside eight agglomerations 
(Finance Act, 2008, GOI), etc. 
 
As a result of these policies and due to existence of huge demand for the health service sector, 
this sector provides incentive to the investors for investments from domestic as well as financial 
investors and private equity firms. Funds such as ICICI Ventures, IFC, Ashmore and Apax 
Partners invested about US$ 450 million in the first six months of 2008-2009 compared to US$ 
125 million during the same period of the previous year. Feedback Ventures expects private 
equity funds to invest at least US$ 1 billion during 2009-2013. 12 percent of the US$ 77 million 
venture capital investments in July-September 2009 were in the healthcare sector. GE plans to 
invest over US$ 3 billion on R&D, US$ 2 billion to drive healthcare information technology and 
health in rural and underserved areas, US$ 1 billion in partnerships, content and services, over 
the next six years. International clinic chain Asklepios International plans to invest US$ 100 -200 
million in the Indian healthcare market. Gulf-based group Dr Moopen is planning to invest US$ 
5 
 
200 million for setting up hospitals and eye-care centres across India. Fortis is planning to invest 
US$ 55 million to expand its pan-India operations. 
 
In the recent decade the medical devices and equipments industry has been successful attracting 
foreign direct investment too though this sector is importing 50%-60% till now. From merely 
US$2.3 million in 2000 it reached US$ 147.69 million in 2009. Some of big foreign firms in the 
sector invested in India either directly or through collaborations and joint ventures. Some to 
mention are GE (USA), Isoft (Australia), Proton Healthcare (USA) and Seimens (Germany) etc. 
 
The term international fragmentation has been used widely in trade literature, the notable 
contributors are Jones & Kierzkowski (2003), Deardoff (2001), Jones and Marjit (2001), Marjit 
(2007), Marjit (2009) etc. All the authors mentioned above have discussed either the causes 
behind the term international fragmentation or relate it (fragmentation) with the pattern of trade. 
Maiti and Marjit (2007) have considered a partial equilibrium framework and they have shown 
that international trade enhances the possibilities of fragmentation in the production process in 
Indian context. Jones and Marjit (2008) have considered a general equilibrium framework and 
from which we can argue that trade may lead to more fragmented activities relative to autarky 
even if one observes specialization. Again Marjit, Beladi and Chakraborty (2003) have shown 
that reduction in the price of intermediate product may lead to a zone which is more fragmented. 
They have also examined the impact of fragmentation on skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
 
Though there exists a quite few number of theoretical works related to international 
fragmentation but very few of them have used general equilibrium structure. Unfortunately at the 
theoretical level almost no work in a general equilibrium structure has been done to relate 
international fragmentation with health sector. The present paper attempts to fill up the lacuna in 
this line. 
 
The present paper is an extension of Marjit, Beladi and Chakraborty (2003) as in this model both 
an exportable sector a health service sector and a health intermediate sector have been 
introduced.  The present paper attempts to examine not only the reasons behind international 
fragmentation but also the impact of such international fragmentation on the output levels of 
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health sector. The impact of FDI to health sector in the presence of international fragmentation is 
also our concerning fact. 
 
In this paper we have tried to examine, i) the impact of movement towards international 
fragmentation of the health sector in the absence of trade liberalization and ii) impact of trade 
liberalization on the health service sector in the presence of international fragmentation. To do so 
we have considered two different models. In model 1 we have shown the impact of movement 
towards international fragmentation of the health sector in the absence of trade liberalization. As 
the economies liberalize, competition in all the markets should increase. To capture the impact of 
such liberalization on the output level of the health service sector in the presence of international 
fragmentation we have considered model 2.  
 
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 considers model 1. It has one 
subsection. Subsection 2.1 considers the drive towards fragmentation and health sector. Section 3 
considers model 2. It is divided into three subsections. Sub section 3.1 considers FDI in the 
health sector, Subsection 3.2 considers international health capital immobility and subsection 3.3 
considers international health capital mobility. Finally, the concluding remarks are made in 
section 4.   
     
2. Model 1 
 
We consider a small open economy consisting of four sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
framework. Out of the four sectors, one is an agricultural sector(A), which produces an 
exportable good (XA) using unskilled labour(L) and capital(K). The second sector is a 
manufacturing sector(M), which produces importable good (XM) by using skilled labour (S) and 
capital. K is perfectly mobile between sectors A and M. The third and fourth sectors of our 
economy are the domestic intermediate health good producing sector (I) and the health sector (H) 
respectively. Sector I uses skilled labour along with health capital (N) for production of the 
intermediate health product (XI) of our economy and the health sector uses health capital4, 
                                                             
4 By the term health intermediate goods we actually mean those commodities which are exhausted due to the course 
of production in the health service sector(H), e.g. injectable goods and its associated products, several chemicals, 
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skilled labour and intermediate health input (XI) to produce another exportable product (XH). 
Here we assume that the requirement of intermediate goods for the production of one unit of 
output of the health sector is fixed. Unskilled labour (L) has been considered as specific to the 
agricultural sector (A). Skilled labour is perfectly mobile among sectors M, H and I. The skilled 
wage rate in the health sector is assumed to be fixed at a higher level compared to the skilled 
wage rate prevail in rest of the sectors. Here health capital is perfectly mobile between sectors I 
and H. Health capital consists of both domestic health capital (ND) and foreign health 
capital(NF), and additionally we assume ND and NF are perfect substitutes. This implies an 
increase in foreign health capital will lead to an increase in the overall health capital endowment 
of the economy.  
 
The agricultural product is considered as the numeraire its price is set equal to unity. We assume 
that both foreign capital income and foreign health capital income are fully repatriated. Markets 
are competitive. Production function in each sector exhibit constant returns to scale with 
diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. The following notations are used in this model.  
 
Xi = product produced by the ith sector, i = A, M, I, H      
P*A = world price of commodity A         
PA = domestic price of commodity A,    we assume PA = P*A = 1    
PM = world price of good M           
PI = domestically determined price of good I  
P*I = price of the foreign intermediate commodity   
PH = world price of good H        
L = fixed number of unskilled workers in the economy  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
equipments used in pathology and different forms of medicines. Again by health capital we mean those equipments 
and products which are not exhausted due to the production process, e.g. ECG machine, X-ray machine etc.   
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S = stock of skilled labour       
ND = domestic health capital stock of the economy      
NF = foreign health capital stock of the economy       
N  = economy ,s aggregate health capital stock (N = ND + NF)     
K = economy,s aggregate capital stock        
aji = quantity of the jth factor for producing one unit of output in the ith sector, j=L,S,K,N and           
i=A,M,I,H         
θji  = distributive share of the jth input in the ith sector     
λji = proportion of the jth factor used in the production of the ith sector    
W = competitive unskilled wage rate  
WS = skilled wage rate        
r  = rate of return to capital         
R = rate of return to health capital        
σi = elasticity of factor substitution in sector i, i = A, M, I, H.     
^ = proportional change          
The equational structure of the model is as follows.      
The competitive equilibrium conditions in the product market for the four sectors give us the 
following equations.         
aLAW +aKAr =1                 (1) 
aSMWS + aKMr = PM                            (2) 
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aSIWS + aNIR = PI                                                                                                                           (3) 
aSH 𝑊𝑊�𝑆𝑆 + aNHR + aIH PI = PH                           (4) 
 
For simplicity we assume that aSH and aIH are given to us. 
 
Equilibrium condition for the health intermediate sector is given by 
aIH XH = XI                                                                                                                                    (5) 
 
Sector specificity of unskilled labour is given by the following equation     
aLAXA = L                                        (6) 
 
Perfect mobility of capital between sectors A and M can be expressed as   
aKAXA + aKMXM = KD+ KF =K               (7) 
 
Full employment of skilled labour implies the following equation     
aSMXM + aSIXI + aSHXH = S                           (8) 
 
Perfect mobility of health capital between sectors H and I can be expressed as   
aNHXH + aNIXI = ND+ NF = N                           (9) 
 
The working of the model is as follows. In this model we have nine equations with nine 
endogenous variables, namely W, WS, r, R, PI, XA, XM, XI, XH, that is, the system is solvable. 
From equation (1) we can express W as a function of r. Similarly from equation (2) we can 
express WS in terms of r. From equation (4) we find that R is a function of PI. Using this fact in 
equation (3) we can express WS in terms of PI. Hence from equations (1) and (2) we can express 
W and r as a function of PI only.  In this model we cannot determine factor prices independently 
from the competitive equilibrium conditions. Thus the structure is an indecomposable structure5. 
Using equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) we can express XA, XM, XI and XH as a function of PI. Thus 
                                                             
5 If the factor prices are determined independently of factor endowments we refer to the structure as a decomposable 
structure. 
10 
 
from equation (5) we can determine the value of PI, as XH and XI are function of PI. Once PI is 
known W, WS, r, R, XA, XM, XI, XH are also known. 
 
In this section we want to analyze several causes due to which fragmentation is possible. In this 
model initially we have considered sector I as a domestic intermediate good producing sector. 
This intermediate good can be imported by the health sector from foreign but in this case it has to 
incur a fixed cost (F) mainly due to transaction or communication factors6. This is the main 
constraint in front of the health sector to buy foreign intermediate good and this leads to an 
increase in demand for domestic intermediate goods. Given supply, an increase in demand for I 
leads to an increase in PI. It implies that no fragmentation situation is associated with higher 
level of PI. Here we are starting with a situation where, domestic intermediate product price is 
greater than international intermediate product price, i.e, PI > P*I. From equation (4) we can say 
that a fall in PI leads to an increase in R, since PH and WS are exogenously given7. Let R* be the 
rate of return on health capital corresponding to the price of the intermediate good P*I. It is to be 
noted that P*I and R* are also negatively related by the similar argument as we use in case of PI 
with R. Let R0 be the initial equilibrium level of R. Then we can say (R*- R0) varies inversely 
also with PI*. This is because R* changes due to a change in PI*, for given R0. So we can say that 
the health sector uses domestic intermediate good, that is, fragmentation is not preferable, iff (R* 
- R0) N < F.  
 
Using the similar argument we can consider different cases, that is, 
case 1: fragmentation is preferable iff (R* - R0)  > F/N 
case2: fragmentation is not preferable iff (R* - R0) < F/N; 
case 3: health sector will be indifferent iff (R* - R0) = F/N. 
The above analysis can be explained with the help of figure-1.  
[Figure 1 here] 
In this paper we find that there exists two critical values of PI* such that for all PI* Є [𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗, PI
*max] 
there is no fragmentation, where 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ is the lower critical value of PI
* and PI*max is the upper 
                                                             
6 For details see Marjit, Beladi and Chakraborty (2003). 
7 For details see Appendix A. 
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critical value of PI*. Here PI*max is nothing but the domestic market determined value of PI. It is 
to be noted for PI* Є (0, 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ ) there will be fragmentation. Thus it is clear from the above figure 
that 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ is the lower critical value of PI
* and it is the maximum price of the foreign intermediate 
for which health sector will go for fragmentation. In this figure the area left of  𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ , that is, where  
𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼
∗ > PI* we have a situation of fragmentation whereas the area to the right of 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼  ∗ upto PI*max gives 
us a situation where fragmentation is not possible. For simplicity here we consider PI* Є [𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗, 
PI*max] as the relevant interval for PI*. 
 
From case 2 we can infer that fragmentation may be possible due to either fall in F or an increase 
in N (or NF hereafter). It is to be noted that a fall in F or an increase in NF leads to a downward 
shift of the F/N schedule. It implies an expansion of the area to the left of  𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ and contraction of 
the area of its counterpart. Again for given F and N, fall in PI towards the lower limit of PI* (𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗) 
leads to a situation where the possibility of fragmentation increases. We state the results in the 
form of following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1:  Fall in the price of domestic intermediate, reduction in fixed cost or an inflow of 
foreign health capital enhances the possibility of fragmentation. 
 
2.1 The Drive towards Fragmentation and the Health Sector 
So far we have analyzed the causes and possibilities of fragmentation. In this section we are 
trying to focus on the drive towards fragmentation in the presence of health sector. It is captured 
through a fall in domestic price (PI) of the intermediate product8. We have already mentioned 
that fall in PI towards 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗ implies a shift from a regime of no fragmentation to a regime of 
fragmentation9. Here we have to examine the intermediary effects of such a regime change.  
From equation (4) we can argue that a fall in PI leading to an increase in R, as PH and WS are 
given. From equation (3) we can say that a reduction in PI and an increase in R lead to a situation 
                                                             
8 Here we assume that fragmentation is possible only through reduction PI because the change of F and N are 
significantly low in the regime where trade liberalization is absent. 
9 Here we consider a finite change of PI. 
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where to maintain equality WS must have to fall. Again reduction in WS leads to an increase in r, 
as PM is given in equation (2). Using this fact in equation (1) we get a fall in W. This fall in W 
implies an increase in aLA so that for maintaining unskilled labour market equilibrium condition 
XA must go down. Again fall in PI leads to an increase in r and hence aKA, aKM must go down. 
Thus from equation (7) we can get an increase in XM. Using equation (5) in equation (9) we 
obtain  
(aNH + aNI aIH) XH = N                                                                                                                  (9/) 
From equation (9/) we can easily argue that XH must go up due to fall in PI [as aNH and aNI 
decrease due to an increase in R]. Similarly equation (8) can be written as  
aSI XI = (S – aSH XH – aSM XM)                    (8/) 
Fall in PI leads to a fall in WS. Reduction in WS leads to increase in the levels of both aSM and aSI. 
Thus increase in the levels of aSH XH, aSM XM and aSI lead to reduction of the right hand side and 
expansion of left hand side of equation (8/). Hence for maintaining skilled labour market 
equilibrium condition XI must go down10. Thus the following proposition can now be 
established. 
 
Proposition 2: A movement from a regime of no fragmentation towards a regime of 
fragmentation leads to an increase in the levels output of both health and manufacturing sector 
and a reduction in the level of output of the agricultural sector. 
 
3. Model 2 
 
3.1 FDI in the Health Sector 
In the earlier model we have analyzed the impact of movement from no fragmentation regime to 
a regime of fragmentation on the output levels of health sector. In this model we are trying to 
                                                             
10 Here we have implicitly assumed that the supply of intermediate health product is the sum of XI and XI+, where 
XI+ is the amount of import of intermediate health product. Thus actual equilibrium condition for health intermediate 
market is aIH XH = XI + XI+. But in the absence of fragmentation it implies XI+ = 0. That is why we have considered 
equation (5) initially. It is to be noted that as we move towards international fragmentation we get an increase in XH 
and reduction of XI. Thus for maintaining the the above equality XI+ must go up as an adjustment term.       
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analyze the impact of liberalization on the health sector in the presence of fragmentation in the 
new set up. In this model we have assumed that the skilled worker of the health service sector is 
also earning competitive skilled wage11. In this paper we consider that total foreign health capital 
stock consists of both domestic health capital and foreign health capital. We have considered two 
regimes here. One is the regime of international health capital immobility and the second one is 
the regime of international health capital mobility. In the context of first regime we have 
considered foreign health capital as exogenous implying the existence of foreign health capital 
immobility. In the second regime we have considered foreign health capital as endogenous.  
 
3.2 International Health Capital Immobility    
We consider a small open economy where international health capital is immobile12 and it 
consists of four sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. The modified equational 
structure can be written as 
The competitive equilibrium conditions in the product market for the three sectors give us the 
following equations.         
aLAW +aKAr =1                 (1) 
aSMWS + aKMr = PM                            (2) 
aSH WS + aNHR + aIH 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗  = PH                           (3) 
 
For simplicity we assume that aSH and aIH are given to us. 
 
Equilibrium condition for the intermediate health product is 
aIH XH =  XI+                                                                                                                                  (4) 
                                                             
11 Here we also assume that aSH is a fixed input-output coefficient as we assume in model 1. 
12 International health capital immobility is a situation where domestic rate of return on foreign health capital (R) is 
greater than the rate of return on foreign health capital in the international market (R+) and there is restriction on the 
entry of foreign health capital to the domestic economy.  
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Here XI+ is the amount of import of intermediate products. 
 
Sector specificity of unskilled labour is given by the following equation     
aLAXA = L                                        (5) 
 
Perfect mobility of capital between sectors A and M can be expressed as   
aKAXA + aKMXM = KD+ KF =K               (6) 
 
Full employment of skilled labour implies the following equation     
aSMXM + aSHXH = S                                       (7) 
 
Sector specificity of foreign health capital is given by the following equation   
aNHXH  = ND+ NF = N                                       (8) 
 
In this model we have eight equations with eight unknowns, namely W, WS, r, R, XA, XM, XI+, 
XH, that is, the system is solvable. From equations (1), (2) and (3) we can express W, WS and R 
as a function of r. In this model we cannot determine factor prices independently from the 
competitive equilibrium conditions. Thus the structure is an indecomposable structure. Using (5) 
and (6) we can express XA, XM in terms of r. Thus from equation (7) we can express XH as a 
function of r. Again from equation (8) one can express XH in terms of r, as N is given. Hence by 
using equations (7) and (8) we can determine the values of XH and r. Once r is known W, WS, R, 
XA, XM, XI+ are also known. 
  
3.3 International Health Capital Mobility  
Here we assume that in the presence of international health capital immobility we have R > R+, 
where R+ is the given return on foreign health capital in the international market. In such a 
situation we have no foreign health capital inflow. If R falls to𝑅𝑅�, where, R> 𝑅𝑅� > R+, we find that 
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there is some amount of inflow of foreign health capital (NF) and at last we will reach at the 
equilibrium level13 of NF where, R = R+.  
Here, we assume that ND is exogenous whereas NF is assumed to be an endogenous variable and 
we use R = R+ in model 2. Thus here we also have eight independent equations with eight 
endogenous variables, so the system can be solved. Using R= R+ from equations (2) and (3) we 
can solve for WS and r (as PI = 𝑃𝑃�𝐼𝐼∗). Once WS and R are known aNH is also known. Thus from 
equation (8) we can express XH as a function of NF, as R is already known and WS can be 
explained in terms of R. Using equations (5) and (6) we can determine the values of XA and XM. 
Hence from equation (7) we can derive the value of XH. Once XH is known then NF and XI+ can 
also be determined from equation (8) and (4) respectively and this completes the working of the 
model.   
 
Explanations of sectoral effects due to liberalization are given below.  An increase in NF implies 
a fall in R. From equation (3) we can say that a fall in R leads to an increase in WS. From 
equations (1) and (2) we can argue that an increase in WS implies an increase in W and a 
reduction in r14. Since an increase in W implies a reduction in aLA, for maintaining unskilled 
labour market equilibrium condition XA must go up. Again fall in r leads to an increase in aKA 
and aKM. Thus from equation (6) we can get a reduction in the output level of sector M (XM). Fall 
in R due to an inflow in NF leads to an increase in WS. Increase in WS leads to a fall in aSM. Thus 
a fall in aSM XM leads to an increase in (S – aSM XM), that is, availability of skilled labour 
increases to the health sector and it induces the health sector to expand15. From equation (5) we 
can argue that XI+ must go up as XH increases due to international health capital mobility.  
 
Proposition 3:   A shift from a regime of international health capital immobility to health capital 
mobility causes an increase in the levels output of both health and agricultural sector and a 
reduction in the level of output of the manufacturing sector. 
                                                             
13 At R=R+, we have the equilibrium level of foreign health capital inflow due to equilibrium in the international 
health capital market. 
14 See Appendix B. 
15 As aSH is given, from equation (7) we can show that an increase in (S- aSMXM) must increase in XH, otherwise 
skilled labour market will be in disequilibrium.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Health service sector and health intermediate sector (medical devices and equipments sector) are 
gaining more importance among the economists and hence these sectors become most important 
parts of the social sector of any developing economy like India. The present paper has considered 
two different models. In the first model we build up a structure (based on H-O-S general 
equilibrium structure) where we introduce health service sector as an export sector and more 
interestingly we assume that the production function of that sector can be fragmented. Here we 
also assume that the wage of skilled labour in the health service sector is fixed at a higher level 
compared to the competitive skilled wage rate. The above mentioned sectors use a special type of 
capital (health capital). In such a set up we have shown that an increase in foreign health capital 
or a decrease in price of health intermediate product may increase the possibilities of 
fragmentation. Apart from this, from that model we have also shown that a change of regime 
from no fragmentation towards fragmentation leads to an increase in the levels output of both 
health and manufacturing sector and a reduction in the level of output of the agricultural sector. 
 
In the second model we have considered a three sector general equilibrium structure where the 
third sector is a health service sector and the production process of that sector is fragmented. 
Here we have examined the impact of trade liberalization in the form of regime change on the 
output levels of different sectors, in the presence of fragmentation. In this part we have shown 
that a change in regime from international health capital immobility to international health 
capital mobility, leads to expansion of both health sector and agricultural sector and contraction 
of manufacturing sector. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Differentiation of equation (4) gives us 
NHθ Rˆ + NHθ NHaˆ + IHθ IPˆ = 0 
Now  σH  = ( NHaˆ - IHaˆ / IPˆ - Rˆ ) 
NHaˆ = ( IPˆ - Rˆ )σH   
Using it we get 
NHθ (1- σH) Rˆ + ( NHθ σH + IHθ ) IPˆ = 0 
Rˆ = - (A2/A1) IPˆ                                                                                                                    (A.1) 
Where, A1, A2 > 0.  
Differentiation of equation (3) gives us, 
aSI dWS + WS daSI + aNI dR + R daNI = dPI 
From the envelop condition we get 
WS daSI + R daNI = 0 
Using envelop condition we get 
SIθ SWˆ  + NIθ Rˆ = IPˆ  
Using (A.1) we get 
SWˆ = {(1/ SIθ ) + ( NIθ / SIθ )(A2/A1)} IPˆ  
 SWˆ = A3 IPˆ                                                                                                                               (A.2) 
Where, A3 > 0. 
Differentiating equation (2) we get 
rˆ = - ( SMθ / KMθ ) SWˆ                                                                                                                  (A.3) 
Similarly from equation (1) one obtain 
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Wˆ = - ( KAθ / LAθ ) rˆ                                                                                                                       (A.4) 
Differentiation of (7) gives us 
HXˆ  = (1/ IHλ ) IXˆ                                                                                                                       (A.5) 
Differentiating equation (6) we get 
NHλ HXˆ + NHλ NHaˆ + NIλ IXˆ  + NIλ NIaˆ  = 0                                                                             (6.A) 
We know, σI = ( NIaˆ - SIaˆ / SWˆ - Rˆ )                                                                                           (A.6) 
Again WS daSI + R daNI = 0 
SIaˆ  = - ( NIθ / SIθ ) NIaˆ                                                                                                                  (A.7) 
Using (A.7) in (A.6) we get  
NIaˆ = σI SIθ ( SWˆ - Rˆ )                                                                                                                 (A.8) 
Inserting the value of (A.8) in equation (6.A) and simplifying we get 
( NHλ  + NIλ IHλ ) HXˆ  = (- NHλ σH) IPˆ + (- NIλ SIθ σIA3) IPˆ  + ( NHλ σH + NIλ SIθ σI)(-A2/A1) IPˆ  
HXˆ = (A5 + A6 + A7/A4) IPˆ                                                                                                       (A.9) 
Where, A5,A6, A7 <0 and A4> 0.  
Differentiation of equation (6) gives us 
LAλ LAaˆ + LAλ AXˆ = 0                                                                                                                 (6.A) 
We know, σA = ( KAaˆ - LAaˆ /Wˆ - rˆ ) 
LAaˆ = KAaˆ - σA (Wˆ - rˆ )                                                                                                              (A.10) 
Using envelop condition we get 
KAaˆ = - ( LAθ / KAθ ) LAaˆ                                                                                                               (A.11) 
Using (A.11) in equation (A.10) and simplifying we get 
LAaˆ = - σA ( KAθ SMθ / KMθ LAθ ) A3 IPˆ                                                                                        (A.12) 
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Using (A.12) in (6.A) we can get 
AXˆ = σA ( KAθ SMθ / KMθ LAθ ) A3 IPˆ                                                                                          (A.13) 
Differentiation of equation (7) gives us 
KMλ MXˆ =  KAλ KAaˆ - KMλ KMaˆ - KAλ AXˆ  
Using (A.11) and (A.12) we get 
KAaˆ = A8 IPˆ                                                                                                                             (A.14) 
Where, A8 = σA ( KAθ SMθ / KMθ LAθ ) A3 ( LAθ / KAθ ) > 0. 
Using the elasticity of substitution of sector M and envelop condition we can get 
KMaˆ  = σM ( SMθ / KMθ ) A3 IPˆ                                                                                                    (A.15) 
Inserting the values of (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) one can obtain 
MXˆ  = [{ KAλ  A8 - KMλ  σM ( SMθ / KMθ ) A3 - KAλ σA ( KAθ SMθ / KMθ LAθ ) A3}/ KMλ ] IPˆ          (A.16) 
 
Appendix B 
Differentiating equation (3) and using envelop condition we get 
SHθ SWˆ  + NHθ Rˆ  = 0 
SWˆ = - (
SH
NH
θ
θ
) Rˆ                                                                                                                        (1.B) 
Differentiating equation (2) we get 
rˆ = - ( SMθ / KMθ ) SWˆ                                                                                                                   (B.1) 
Using (1.B) in equation (B.1) we get 
rˆ  = ( SMθ NHθ / KMθ SHθ ) Rˆ      
rˆ  = B1 Rˆ                                                                                                                                     (2.B)  
Where, B1 > 0. 
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From equation (1) after differentiation one obtain 
Wˆ = - ( KAθ / LAθ ) rˆ                                                                                                                       (B.2) 
Using (2.B) in equation (B.2) we can obtain 
Wˆ = - ( KAθ / LAθ ) B1 Rˆ                                                                                                                 (3.B) 
 
